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Slavic Review himself, and it is a powerful one, is allegory," said Benjamin. 3 However unrecognizable, these allegorical images retain their dependency upon the past; but this relationship cannot be described in those terms that Russian cultural criticism is accustomed to. In the emerging fi eld of Russian memory studies, concepts are either imported from the neighboring fi elds of Holocaust studies or postcolonial studies, or invented anew. Combining these approaches, I coin the concept "magical historicism" to defi ne the bizarre but instructive imagery that has evolved out of postcatastrophic, post-Soviet culture.
Unjustifi ed Repressions
In the novel Opravdanie ( Justifi cation, 2001), Dmitrii Bykov presents the young Moscow historian, Slava Rogov. Rogov is obsessed with his grandfather who was arrested in 1938. Struggling to fi nd his grandfather, Rogov develops an ingenious theory of Stalinism. Those "repressions," he thinks, could not be "unjustifi ed"; they must have had an interpretable meaning. Rogov theorizes that people were subjected to unbearable suffering in order to select out those few who were fi t to survive it all. Those who gave up under torture and confessed to invented crimes betrayed Iosif Stalin by doing so and had to perish; those who resisted to the end were preserved, healed, and trained. 4 As operatives and leaders, these people changed the course of World War II and the Cold War, Rogov believes. Inspired by this theory, he travels to Siberia in hope of fi nding his grandfather on a secret Soviet-style reservation. On his journey, he discovers a clandestine community of religious sectarians with weird rituals, a sadomasochist resort in which New Russians torture their peers for pleasure, and fi nally, a Siberian marsh, where he drowns himself.
In this fantasy, the fl amboyant author and media anchor Bykov has touched a nerve of post-Soviet memory. 5 By creating a direct connection between grandsons and grandfathers, the fi ctional post-Soviet family renders the fi nal Soviet generation irrelevant. 6 Andrei Bitov should be 3. Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne (London, 1998), 185.
4. Bykov's logic of torture differs from a more familiar understanding articulated by Arthur Koestler in his Darkness at Noon, trans. Daphne Hardy (New York, 1941). As Koestler sees it, torture convinces the true-believer that the party really wants his confession as another sacrifi ce for its cause. 6. This construction develops the better-known Russian speculation on "literary generations" advanced by Viktor Shklovskii. In his postrevolutionary essay on Rozanov (1921), Viktor Shklovskii stated that in literature, "inheritance proceeds not from father to eldest son but from uncle to nephew." Viktor Shklovskii, O teorii prozy (Moscow, 1925) . Iurii Tynianov in his Arkhaisty i novatory (Leningrad, 1929) emphasized leaps in two directions, backward and forward, as mechanisms of "literary evolution." Like these genealogical models, Bykov's characters (and Bitov's, as we shall see) avoid immediate predecessors in favor of more distant forebears.
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Slavic Review its meaning. Indeed, nothing is more absurd and more terrifying than absurd terror. Striving to interpret it, one has speculative license that can only be used or abused in radical ways, because facts of Soviet history tend to remain more bizarre than the strangest allegations about them. Essentially, the history textbook for Russian high schools presents as truth the same idea that Bykov's novel explored as a paranoiac delusion: that the mass violence of the early Soviet era helped to shape the New Soviet Man, the tortured Bolshevik version of the Übermensch.
By historical standards, the Soviet catastrophe is recent and the memory of it fresh. In 1956, Nikita Khrushchev initiated his de-Stalinization campaign. To explain what had happened, he introduced a few concepts that are still with us. 9 As the idiom for mass murders, arrests, and deportations, he chose the phrase neobosnovannye repressii. These "unjustifi ed repressions," which were always mentioned in the plural, present a striking concept: a formula for senseless acts of violence that do not specify agency and, therefore, elude responsibility. In contrast to the Nazi terror, in the Soviet Union no specifi c group (as defi ned by ethnicity, territory, profession, age, gender, and so on) suffered signifi cantly more than other groups, with one exception: "A particularly heavy toll among Stalin's victims was, of course, extracted from the state and party apparatus." 10 Confl ating subject and object in a stereotypically Russian manner, Soviet repressions differed from Nazi German exterminations, in which the victims and perpetrators were distanced by crystal-clear constructions. "Unjustifi ed repressions" mean, exactly, self-imposed, meaningless social catastrophe. 11 There have been three stages in the Russian memory of these "repressions": denial, repression, and interpretation. Khrushchev's "revelations" of 1956 brought an end to the stage of denial, which had been the offi cial policy for decades. The subsequent thirty years were marked by inconsistent moves that revealed as much as they obscured. Transferred from politics to culture, the work of memory became the most sensitive ideological issue of the regime. Political dissidence and cultural achievement melded 9 . Recent collection of documents in seven volumes, Istoriia stalinskogo GULAGa, ed. Iurii N. AfanasЈev and V. P. Kozlov, started with vol. 1, Massovye repressii v SSSR (Moscow, 2004 . In response, the communist ideologists launched a veritable memory war, which distanced the cultural elite and contributed to the regime's imminent decay. Playing with two meanings of "repression," the Soviet and historical on the one hand, the western and psychoanalytic on the other hand, I would call this dark period of memory "the repression of repressions." Starting from the "perestroika" of the mid-1980s, new revelations documented the processes, institutes, and personalities of terror with unprecedented details. The period of "glasnost" produced an amazing array of republications, translations, memoirs, and original studies of Stalinism. 12 Historical novels, fi lms, and documentaries were produced and disseminated in abundance. In the Russian politics, media, and popular history of the last decade, "the legacy of the 1990s" has been intensely challenged and revised. Very often, these contemporary debates address the Soviet past. Historical facts, as they were revealed by the previous generation of authors and readers, have not been reconsidered. Their interpretation is the issue.
Since we lack an all-embracing concept of the Soviet catastrophe, the gulag has become the Russian counterpart for the Holocaust. Historically, the gulag is the bureaucratic acronym of the Stalin era's State Administration of Camps, which was closed in 1960. The late Veniamin Iofe, probably the most impressive intellectual of the memorial movement in Russia, defi ned the gulag as the summary term for Soviet oppression, including its long-standing internalized form. "Our compatriots still have the gulag within," Iofe wrote in 2001. 13 With this range of defi nitions, it is not surprising that the number of gulag victims is uncertain; the available estimates range between 5 and 30 million. Indeed, the only certainty about 12. For a comprehensive analysis of various genres of memory of the gulag, see Leona Toker, Return from the Archipelago: Narratives of Gulag Survivors (Bloomington, 2000); see also Kathleen E. Smith, Remembering Stalin's Victims: Popular Memory and the End of the USSR (Ithaca, 1996) . In recent years, autobiographical accounts have received more scholarly attention than other forms of memory; see Véronique Garros, Natalia Korenevskaya, and Thomas Lahusen, eds., Intimacy and Terror: Soviet Diaries of the 1930s (New York, 1995); Irina Paperno, "Personal Accounts of the Soviet Experience," Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 3, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 577-610; Jochen Hellbeck and Klaus Heller, eds., Autobiographical Practices in Russia/Autobiographische Praktiken in Russland (Göttingen, 2004) . Jehanne Gheith suggests that the survivors of the gulag do not easily tell their autobiographical stories but rather develop non-narrative forms of memory, such as naming a dog something that is reminiscent of their camp experience. Jehanne Gheith, " 'I Never Talked . . .': Trauma, the Non-Narrative, and the Gulag," Mortality 12, no. 
Victims into Sacrifi ces
Founded in 1987 by enthusiasts of memory who started a campaign for the national monument to the victims of repressions, Memorial is a nongovernmental organization with a complex, ambivalent-to-hostile relationship to the Russian state.
14 The fi rst memorial, a simple granite stone, was erected in 1989 in the cemetery on Solovetskii Island by Iofe and a group of activists from Memorial. Years later, the same group erected stones from Solovetskii in Moscow and St. Petersburg. In 1999, at the Solovetskii cemetery, Iofe said that his stone was a "question mark that asked about the meaning of this tragedy. We wanted to understand why all these millions were sacrifi ced, if they were indeed sacrifi ced. What was the supreme value that demanded these sacrifi ces?" 15 Iofe's doubt about the very idea of sacrifi ce is well justifi ed. Giorgio Agamben, in philosophical work partially inspired by the Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi, developed the concept of Homo sacer, defi ned as "a human victim that may be killed but not sacrifi ced." 16 The "bare life" of this victim makes an exception to any legal, political, or religious order. It differs from the political life that has a recognized value and may be sacrifi ced by one's own or a sovereign's will; then this life would be remembered as that of a hero or a martyr. Living in the "zone of exception" from the laws and customs of the state, Homo sacer is subject to the exclusive competence of the sovereign. Though these zones of exception are always porous and their borders are never stable, the rules and norms that defi ne life in these zones cannot be expressed in terms that are meaningful outside these zones.
As often happens in mundane situations of violence or premature death, the victims, and even more so their peers and their descendants, wish to fi nd meaning in their suffering. If meaning can be discovered, then death becomes a sacrifi ce, rather than just a loss or a murder. Mass murders can be sacrifi cially interpreted in religious terms, as punishment for sins, or in political terms, as the cost of nation building, modernization, or similar causes. The Russian language adds to the possible confusion: the Russian word zhertva has both meanings, "victim" and "sacrifi ce," though the word zhertvoprinoshenie defi nitely means "sacrifi ce." Iofe's refusal to interpret murder as sacrifi ce motivated his choice of the simple local stone, an empty signifi er or "question mark," as the proper form of the memorial: "an ordinary natural stone which, with time, could probably (Interestingly, Iofe imagined that his monument would undergo a spontaneous adjustment, something like a selffashioning that would adapt it to the changing understanding of history.) What is truly important for this memorial practice is location-the site of the murder, the place of origin of the stone. Though Iofe fought against the interference of the Orthodox Church in the mourning for nonbelievers and his idea of memory was explicitly nonconfessional, his choice of a large and local memorial object like a stone suggests his sense of the spirit of place, which remains after a murder or even travels with a stone to another place. Indeed, there is no explanation for why huge boulders had to be transported thousands of miles away, from Solovki to Moscow and St. Petersburg, unless the spirit of the place travels with them.
In 1991, the statue to the founder of Soviet political terror and the Solovetskii camp, Feliks Dzerzhinskii, was replaced by a monument to its victims, the stone brought from this camp (in 2002, another Solovetskii stone was erected in St. Petersburg). Understanding its meaning all too well, Iurii Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, made plans to offi cially reinstate the statue to Dzerzhinskii. Various compromises have been discussed, one of them being the replacement of the Solovetskii stone with a gigantic water clock. 18 Two symbolic visions compete on this spot, one of historical time, which changes by leaps from the old condition (monument to the executioner) to the new and radically different one (monument to his victims); another of circular time, which always returns to the starting point, like a water clock.
The monument in Sandarmokh shows an angel with widespread wings whose hands are tied. On the top of a high stone obelisk, an inscription declares, "People, do not kill each other." This fi gurative sculpture was created in 1998 by Grigorii Saltup, a prolifi c artist and writer from Petrozavodsk. 19 Today, the memorial in Sandarmokh is arguably the most important, and best developed, of secular sites of memory of the Soviet victims. Its most impressive element consists of sharply pointed wooden stakes (stolbtsy) marking every mass grave. Dozens of these markers are scattered around the pine forests.
According to the recent (August to September 2007) exhibition of monuments to the victims of the gulag (curators Liudmila Vasilovskaia and Galina Atmashkina), there are 1,140 such monuments and memorial plaques within the territory of the former Soviet Union: stones, crosses, 17. Iofe, "Itogi veka," 52. Iofe explicitly played with the double meaning of "zhertva": "My khoteli poniatЈ, esli eto byli deistvitelЈno zhertvy, to chto zhe eto za vyschaia tsennostЈ, kotoraia potrebovala millionnykh zhertvoprinoshenii?" Ibid. 19. Saltup writes that the Karelian government promised money for the monument but never provided it; Saltup believes that the ministry wanted a kickback. Working from the three-meter model in his workshop, Saltup mortgaged his apartment, reduced the size of the project, and completed it in a local factory Grigorii Saltup, Barak i sto deviatnadtsatyi (Petrozavodsk, 2004 obelisks, bells, bas-reliefs, and angels. There are also strange monsters-a monument in Magadan by Ernst Neizvestny, which represents a huge concrete Leviathan composed of multiple human faces with a cross in place of the nose; a monument in St. Petersburg by Mikhail Shemiakin, which represents two sphinxes; and "Molokh totalitarizma" in Levashovo (by N. Galitskaia and V. Gambarov), which shows a robotic cannibal devouring or raping a human fi gure. 20 There are very few realistic monuments that depict an actual prisoner in a moment of suffering. Interestingly, if anthropomorphic sculptures are found at all, they are usually erected in places like Ukraine, Kazakhstan, or Tuva, where a bare, senseless life in the camp is easier to reimagine as a sacrifi ce to the nationalist cause (for example, in the Tuva republic, a huge bronze man in national clothing was erected early in 1989 with the inscription, "The Untamed. To the victims of political repressions in Tuva"). The imagining of meaningless suffering requires nonhuman, abstract, or monstrous symbols. The general rule seems to be that guilt monuments are nonfi gurative, while pride monuments tend to depict people, on horseback or not.
Monuments to the Soviet victims have been built by the civil society, but the resources necessary for these monuments, starting with their sites, are controlled by the state. The only trustworthy feature of the memorialized event seems to be the location of the murders-Butovo, Sandarmokh, Levashovo . . . the site of memory, as the French historian Pierre Nora called it in his groundbreaking study. 21 However, many monuments are erected, not on the former sites of murder, but near them: near the KGB edifi ce on Lubianka Square in Moscow, across the Neva from the Kresty prison in St. Petersburg, in the yard of the KGB residence in Vologda. Rather than the replacement of the old regime by a new one, this pattern instead suggests their quiet coexistence. But even such proximate location of memory is far from being the rule in Russia. Near the building of the Leningrad NKVD-KGB-FSB there is not a single plaque commemorating the thousands or, perhaps, millions of its victims. Such a monument is absent from the vicinity of the Kremlin as well.
Existing museums or exhibitions reconstruct a barrack, a cell, or barbed wire-things that were present when the camp functioned. In contrast, memorial obelisks, stones, and stakes were not present in the camps and do not imitate the historical reality. Perhaps a way to interpret such a monument's vertical shape and central location is to imagine a wooden stake nailing a mythological vampire to the ground. In the tradition of Russian scholarship, there was a theoretical attempt to conceptualize the autonomous life of monuments. Roman Jakobson noted that in Kamennyi gostЈ [The stone guest], for example) a human character confronts a statue that comes to life to deprive the character of his mind or life. 22 A contrasting idea was formulated more recently by another RussianAmerican scholar, Mikhail Iampolski, who believes that a monument creates a "mystical protective zone" that induces "the experience of temporal metamorphosis," a sacral space that stops the fl ow of time. 23 Both positions are justifi ed. Precisely because monuments freeze history, their rare moments of dynamism are imbued with uncanny effects resulting from the exchange between the living and the dead. The mystical or hallucinatory resurgence of monuments, as in Pushkin's poems, is uncanny; real and practical events that happen to monuments, such as their removal, destruction, vandalism, or renaming, also provoke strong responses in the observers. In Pushkin's Mednyi vsadnik, the uncanny effect was created by a monument that was moving in the text; symmetrically, texts are able to vitalize monuments when they penetrate the monumental space.
It is the combination of stones and texts that makes monuments work; without words, the meaning of these stones would be undecipherable. In this way, the monument becomes the center of a social ritual that integrates this construction with ceremonial texts and performative acts in an organized, politically meaningful spectacle of memory. Two types of texts interact in this ritual: short and clear inscriptions on the monument (for example, on the Vologda memorial stone, "We love. We remember. We mourn," or, on the Sandarmokh monument, "People, do not kill each other") and the variety of songs, legends, novels, memoirs, and historical studies, which the participants know, share, and exchange in the ritual and beyond it. 24 Since Emil Durkheim, rituals have been known to be the Mourning rituals that integrate monuments, texts, and performative acts are indispensable mechanisms of cultural memory.
Sociological polls tell us that the denial of the catastrophe, which was practiced by the Soviet regime, is not popular in post-Soviet Russia. In 2007, Dina Khapaeva and Nikolai Koposov polled standard samples in St. Petersburg, KazanЈ, and Ulianovsk. They report that 91.6 percent of Russians agree that "repressions" did take place in 1937 and 63.5 percent correctly believe that "tens of millions of victims" suffered from these "repressions." 26 Leonid Byzov from the Russian Center of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) polled a national sample about what happened in 1937. Approximately half of the respondents mentioned repressions; the other half remembered nothing. According to this poll, about 20.1 percent of Russians recalled that their relatives were in the gulag. The majority of young Russians support the construction of monuments to these victims. 27 American sociologists Sarah H. Mendelson and Theodor P. Gerber sponsored a series of polls in Russia from 2003 to 2005. In this survey, about 26 percent of young respondents reported that they had at least one relative who was "repressed" during the Soviet period. 28 If one compares these sociological results with the current evaluations of the number of Soviet victims by historians, the conclusion is that popular estimates are either close to those given by historians or even overstated. Yet Russian and foreign scholars tend to grumble about the condition of memory in contemporary Russia. Many speculate about collective nostalgia, cultural amnesia, or notice the "cold" character of memory of the Soviet terror. 29 In my view, available surveys reveal the complex and textual domain (e.g., the long quotations from Anna Akhmatova's Requiem that are inscribed on Shemiakin's bronze sphinxes on the Neva). On the relationship between texts and monuments in post-Soviet memorial culture, see Aleksandr Etkind "Vremia sravnivatЈ kamni: Postrevoliutsionnaia kulЈtura politicheskoi skorbi v sovremennoi Rossii," Ab Imperio The Nazi practices followed their Nazi theories more consistently than the Soviet practices followed the Soviet theories. Most of those whom the Nazis believed to be Jews agreed that they were Jews. Most of those whom the Bolsheviks believed to be wreckers did not agree that they were wreckers; moreover, they probably also hated "wreckers." From the Jewish point of view, being a Jew was not a crime; the Nazi victims' feelings were evidently different from the feelings of the Soviet victims. In Soviet camps, the typical victim often accepted the general principles of his perpetrators but believed that in his personal case, he was mistakenly identifi ed. In Nazi camps, on the other hand, the typical victim did not question his identification (as a Jew) but objected to the general reasons for his persecution. These are two deeply different sentiments. Their consequences were also different: a strong and coherent antifascist and Zionist movement in one case and a disordered panoply of loyalty, neutrality, and resistance to the Soviet state, in the other.
In his pioneering portrait of a prisoner, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn presented Ivan Denisovich, a shrewd Jack-of-all-trades, whose folksy vitality enabled him to endure the gulag. Shalamov described his characters as semi-corpses whose suffering from hunger, labor, and humiliation deprives them of any decency or hope. In the Soviet camps, these people were called fi tili (literally, "wicks") and dokhodiagi (soon-to-be-dead); in Auschwitz, they were, curiously, called Muselmann (muslims). They had little chance of survival, and because of that, they did not bear witness. By all accounts, the soon-to-be-dead constituted a large part of the prisoners; since the Soviet camps did not practice the Nazi procedures of "selection," which eliminated the sick and weak, many of those who perished in the gulag spent their last weeks and months as the soon-to-be-dead. Solzhenitsyn and Shalamov distrusted one another because they introduced the world of the gulag from two opposing perspectives, of a survivor and a soon-to-be-dead. 31 In his analysis of the memoirs of the Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi, Agamben noticed that the victims bear witness only rarely. Survivors write memoirs, not victims. Survivors occupy the memory of the camps. 32 Shalamov is one of the rare cases of a soon-to-be-dead who, for no particular reason, was saved by a camp doctor.
There are several ways to make sense of the gulag experience. The functional argument speculates that terror was instrumental for the state, and therefore, those who understood its stately function and collaborated with the state were heroes. The survival argument proposes that survival in the gulag required rare human qualities, and therefore, those who survived the gulag were heroes. The witness argument posits that the survivors' task was to tell the truth about the gulag, and therefore, those who survived in order to bear witness were heroes. While Solzhenitsyn presented his experience of survival as a moral lesson for mankind, Shalamov denied any value in the gulag experience and decried the vanity of survival. Individual survival could be accidental or it could be earned by skills and tricks like those that Ivan Denisovich demonstrated; for Shalamov, survival was as senseless as the whole system of the gulag. In his story "Tishina," Shalamov shows deliberately variegated people (generals, kolkhoz members, religious sectarians, and so on), all of whom are the soon-to-be-dead. They are alive mainly because they have no energy to die; when they, accidentally, receive a full lunch, the strongest of them, the sectarian, fl ees to his death. The very form of Shalamov's literary work, his hatred of what he called "belletrization," the seeming lack of organization in his Kolyma Tales, exemplifi es his refusal to inscribe meaning into suffering. 33 Shalamov's characters are not heroes or martyrs; they are victims who are sometimes endowed with a rare understanding of their fate. These characters are "radical stoics," as Benjamin described characters in the baroque "mourning plays." In Benjamin's analysis, which was inspired by Carl Schmitt, these characters respond to the external state of emergency with "the stoic technique" that "aims to establish a corresponding fortifi cation against the state of emergency in the soul." They are "antihistorical creation[s]," these radical stoics, because to give up this last defense and to interiorize the meaning of emergency implies complicity with the terror. 34 Shalamov's stories erected that very "fortifi cation against the state of emergency" in his soul, and more generally, in Russian memory.
In his remarkable letter to Solzhenitsyn, Shalamov admired the story of Ivan Denisovich but objected to a cat that was mentioned in this story: there were no cats in camps, wrote Shalamov, since they were eaten. 35 In one of his stories, the narrator compares himself to a horse and speculates that a horse would not survive what he survives. This narrator saw no more meaning in his labor than a horse would; strikingly, Shalamov did not try to fi nd consolation in his authorship either. Primo Levi wrote that he wanted to survive in Auschwitz so that he could bear witness; Shalamov never said this. Shalamov's life after the gulag was not much different from his life in it; he was writing anyway. Having survived three terms in the gulag and, between and after these terms, many years of Soviet life, Shalamov died in an elite retirement house in Moscow in 1982. To one visitor, this facility looked like Shalamov's home in the gulag: "the smell of urine, dirt, and rot . . . a huge broad corridor and on its vinyl fl oor, entirely helpless people were crawling." 36 Deaf, convulsing, and delusory, Shalamov was one of those people; still, he was composing poems. The monument on Shalamov's grave was vandalized in 2002; robbers removed his bronze head from the granite pedestal. However, the house in Vologda where he was born is now a museum. Affi rming his sovereignty by creating zones of exception, the sovereign denies responsibility for the abuses committed in these zones. But with the passing of time, and with the scale of the abuses revealed, the sovereign changes his strategy. His last resource is a sacrifi cial interpretation, which presents victims as sacrifi ces. In the post-Soviet situation, this strategy demonstrates several dimensions. Psychologically, it responds to the descendants' desperate need to fi nd meaning in their losses. Morally, it amounts to the normalization of the terror that killed millions. Historically, it requires the more or less sophisticated service of hired professionals who are paid to produce a smooth narrative of a false and tragic variety. Politically, it allows for the continuity of the state. An alternative solution to the conundrum of post-Soviet memory is the recognition of the "unjustifi ed" (Khrushchev) and "senseless" (Shalamov) nature of the terror. This is a diffi cult strategy; not for nothing was Shalamov accused of nihilism. 37 catastrophe senseless is historically true but emotionally dangerous. Often, though not invariably, this work of memory produces monsters.
The Post-Soviet Uncanny
The circular time of post-traumatic experience uneasily confl ates with the linear time of history.
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Though losses may be massive, mourning is personal; collective rituals and cultural artifacts are critical for the process of mourning, however. By sharing sorrow with the community, burial rituals prevent mourning from developing into melancholy. Crystals of memory, monuments keep the uncanny where it belongs-in the grave. The anthropologist Katherine Verdery asserts that "in many human communities, to set up right relations between living human communities and their ancestors depends critically on proper burials." Though it is never easy to learn which relations are "right," wrong relations are universally believed to be unfair to the dead and dangerous to the living. "Because the living not only mourn their dead but also fear them as sources of possible harm, . . . various parts of the funeral ritual . . . aim specifi cally to prevent a disgruntled soul from coming back." 39 In the post-Soviet economics of memory, where the losses are massive and the monuments in short supply, the dead return as the undead. Innocent victims can turn into uncanny monsters.
The ex-prisoner Veniamin Iofe wrote that to survive in a Soviet camp was to experience a symbolic death that always threatened to become real. Every personal survival was a return from the land of the dead. To Iofe, the collective post-Soviet transition was something similar; he imagined the whole nation returning to new life from a state of frozen nonbeing. 40 Post-traumatic culture works in repetitive, vacillating movements that simultaneously reconstruct the shock of the past, as it supposedly happened, and defamiliarize it in such a way that the new returns of this past take different, and therefore engaging, forms. In the individual psyche as depicted by Freud, the repressed returns as the uncanny in a repetitive, compulsive way. Culture also allows the repressed to recur in uncanny forms; however, these forms need a permanent reshaping and refreshment. The cultural return of the repressed is accompanied by a defamiliarization of the past. I believe that post-Soviet memory can be productively situated at the crossroads of these two concepts, one of which is rooted in Freudian psychoanalysis and another, in Russian formalism.
The post-Soviet uncanny is profuse, but it has barely been noticed In one of the most hermetic novels of its time, Iurii Mamleev's Shatuny (Vagrants, 1988), the gloomy central character, Fedor Sonnov, is able to talk only to corpses, preferably to those whom he has killed himself. He is not interested in women, work, or anything but the dead. The random murder of a student with whose corpse he establishes an inspired, sublime dialogue provides the pinnacle of his life. In the same dacha community, a Soviet-style intelligent is dying; after his death, or instead of it, this professor is transformed into a half-chicken, half-human monster whom other characters call kuro-trup (chickencorpse). Written with multiple allusions to Andrei Belyi and Konstantin Vaginov, this strange fi ction was one of the fi rst exemplars of the emerging genre. Mamleev's enemies labeled this genre necrophilic, not without reason; more sympathetic readers saw in Shatuny the advent of Russian postmodernism. 42 The son of a professor of psychiatry who died in the gulag, Mamleev emigrated to the United States in 1975, and he claims to have taught Russian literature at Cornell University. He wrote Shatuny in Paris but now lives in Russia, where he is particularly close to Aleksandr Dugin, the leader of the pro-Kremlin Eurasian movement. In his comment on Shatuny, Dugin wrote that Sonnov "uses the soul of every victim as a streetcar that brings him to the afterworld" and that he represents "the uncanny truth" about "the Russian people, who are pregnant with metaphysical rebellion." 43 Sonnov's "uncanny truth" probably concerns the enormity of the Soviet losses; his compulsive desire to talk to the dead is, simply, a Hamlet-like obsession with parental spirits. To be sure, Mamleev's eerie, semiconscious version of mourning is fundamentally different from the factual, righteous account of the past exemplifi ed by Solzhenitsyn. This difference is similar to one between a documentary fi lm that represents a catastrophe by reconstructing its facts, scale, and causes, and a horror movie that reenacts a trauma, distorting all its features but actualizing the most important one, its horror. 43. Aleksandr Dugin, Tampliery proletariata: Natsional-bolЈshevizm i initsiatsiia (Moscow, 1997).
44. Analytically, this difference is close to the distinction between "acting out" and "working through" the trauma, as described by LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, 141. For an inspiring analysis of horror fi lms in relation to national traumas in fi ve cul- In contrast to the bizarre and almost unreadable Mamleev, the younger Viktor Pelevin is highly successful in Russia and abroad. In Pelevin's Sviaschennaia kniga oborotnia (The sacred book of the werefox, 2004), characters are werewolves; in Ampir V (Empire V, 2006), vampires. In Sviaschennaia kniga, the narrator is an immortal fox who can turn into a woman at will. Working as a prostitute in Moscow, she meets a werewolf who works there as a general of the secret police. Shaken by love, the vigorous wolf is reduced to a dog; at this moment we learn that this general's name is actually Sharikov (the name of the semi-dog, semi-human character of Bulgakov's Sobachie serdtse). From time to time, General Sharikov travels to the north, where he growls at the exhausted oil wells in the abandoned camps, begging them to produce oil. 45 The subtitle of Pelevin's Empire V is "A Story about a Real Superman," which alludes to both Friedrich Nietzsche's Zarathustra and Boris Polevoi's "PovestЈ o nastoiashchem cheloveke" (A story about a real man, 1946), a Soviet classic. The narrator is a young Muscovite, Roman/Rama, whom vampires prepare for the role of a demonic post-Soviet ruler. In contrast to ancient vampires who sucked humans' blood, modern vampires are dairy farmers who milk their cattle, humans, for the elixir called "bablos" (Pelevin derives this term from a slang word meaning money and whores). Initiated by a bite of his predecessor, Rama learns two arts of power, "glamour" and "discourse." At times turning into a bat, at times presiding over a meeting of oligarchs who collect the tribute from humans and pass it to vampires, Rama is confused. However, he fi nds consolation in the idea that his new vampiric identity is no more surprising than his earlier transfi guration from a Soviet child into a post-Soviet man: "It was really strange when the epoch ended but the people stayed where they were . . . The world became entirely different. There was something insane [umopomrachitelЈnoe] in it." 46 Quoting from Bram Stoker and paraphrasing Franco Moretti, characters discuss the vampiric nature of money in terms that sound unmistakably Marxist. 47 Unfortunately, this language helps vampires establish their power over humans but does not help humans banish vampires.
Pelevin's swinging between werewolves and vampires is understandable. In Slavic folklore, dogs, wolves, and werewolves were believed to be the worst enemies of vampires. The unburied turns into a vampire unless 
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Despite Shalamov's remark that stories of the gulag have no realistic place for animals, dogs play a strangely large part in its cultural memory. One of the early realistic narratives of the gulag, Vernyi Ruslan by Georgii Vladimov (Faithful Ruslan, 1975) , focuses on a guard dog who is a more reliable witness than either the prisoners or their jailors. The popular Vladimir Vysotskii, who celebrated the collective voice of ex-prisoners, presented himself as a trapped wolf in one of his famous songs "Okhota na volkov." Finally, of course, one thinks about the recent campaign against corruption among Russian police offi cers, in which the implicated were called, publicly and offi cially, werewolves (oborotni). The strange success of the Russian artist Oleg Kulik who plays a barking and biting dog in his performances, can be understood in light of these connections. 49 Turning from zoomorphic to historicist to mystical metaphors, Pelevin's writing has been invariably marked by post-Soviet themes. In ZhiznЈ nasekomykh (The life of insects, 1993), Pelevin's human insects sound like the confused Soviets who were moving into the new era; in Ampir V, his Muscovite vampires appear as an ambitious but still awkward elite. In his early essay "Comparative Anthropology," Pelevin interpreted the Soviet experience as Zombiefi cation. Basing his ideas on The Serpent and the Rainbow by Wade Davis (1985), Pelevin describes how Haitian secret societies converted humans into zombies by kidnapping them, beating them to death, burying them, digging them out the next day, and selling them as farmhands to plantation owners. Since they passed through symbolic death and revival, the zombies were undead; so were those who passed through Soviet life, speculated Pelevin. He imagines a person who, "after reading some brochures," initiates perestroika in a typical Soviet town but falls "into the incomprehensible pit. There are half-rotten logs, skeletons of horses and humans, pieces of ceramics and ruined metal around. He is in the grave." He is a zombie who returns to the grave from which he came. A Soviet town rests on the remains of a camp: try to change it-and you are pulled into the gulag below. Its population is zombifi ed. "Many zombies were members of the Soviet Union of Writers and therefore, zombies were described from the inside as well as from the outside." 50 Forty years earlier, Shalamov questioned the use of what he called "satire" and "the grotesque" in the literature about the camps. Shalamov detected experiments with these forms in the early work of Andrei Sinia- vskii and Iulii DanielЈ in 1966. These writers were then on trial for publishing their work abroad. In a letter to a fellow ex-prisoner, Shalamov wrote that "our experience entirely excludes the use of the genres of the grotesque or the fantastic. But neither Siniavskii nor DanielЈ has seen those rivers of blood that we saw. They can use the grotesque and the fantastic of course." 51 For Shalamov, this new style was a result of inexperience. Though Siniavskii continued his work with history, satire, and magic well after he received his personal experience of the camps, there may be a kernel of truth in Shalamov's statement. The next generation of writers, who have never seen the camps themselves, have been increasingly engaged in "the grotesque." It seems important that in a recent piece of literary (self-)criticism, Bykov drew his genealogy of the post-Soviet authors from Siniavskii rather than from Shalamov. 52 Because he had direct experience of the camps but incorporates magic into his narratives, Siniavskii stands as a seminal fi gure for Bykov, Pelevin, and others.
Magical Historicism
From the start, the cultural representation of the gulag has been imbued with strange creatures. Everyone remembers the amazing start of Solzhenitsyn's The Gulag Archipelago, the story of a delicious frozen monster, a prehistoric triton (a salamander in the English translation by Thomas P. Whitney), that is devoured by the prisoners. With the help of this triton, Solzhenitsyn presents the mission of his great book in strikingly ambivalent words. He wishes to render the camp not "as a nightmare to be cursed" but "as a monstrous world" to be "almost" loved; he hopes to bring this world to the startled reader "like the bones and fl esh of that salamander which is still, incidentally, alive." The mythological Triton has a man's head, a fi sh's tail, and a conch shell to raise storms, as Solzhenitsyn did. As an oceanic beast, Triton is, I would add, a distant relative of the Leviathan. 53 In 1945, Anna Akhmatova wrote a prophetic poem, "There are three ages to memories." With the passing of time, human memory defamil- And there are no remaining witnesses to the events, And no one to weep with, no one to remember with. And slowly the shades withdraw from us, Shades we no longer call back, Whose return would be too terrible for us . . . And then it is that bitterness wells up:
We realize that we couldn't have fi t That past into boundaries of our life . . . That those who died we would not recognize. 54 Akhmatova predicted important lines in the development of Russian memory: "I'd like to name them all by name, But the list has been confi scated . . . And if ever in this country They decide to erect a monument to me." 55 Akhmatova speaks about this monument not metaphorically (text as a monument) but literally, as a manmade monument that would, hopefully, be erected in her memory. She does not specify any feature of this monument but its location: "Here," in a Leningrad prison, Kresty. This is an essential feature of the postcatastrophic monument: it does not have a visual concreteness, since any such concreteness would reduce the catastrophic experience to a human routine; it memorializes the fact and location of the catastrophe. But, as Akhmatova foresaw in the contemporaneous Poema bez geroia, another and very different image will accompany her memory:
И на зов этот издалека Вдруг откликнется страшный звук-Клокотание, стон и клекот. . .
And from afar, responding to this appeal, Come the terrible soundsOf gurgling, groans and screams . . . 56 
Slavic Review
The theme of uncanny, otherworldly beasts is certainly not unknown to Russian literature. One easily remembers zadumchivyi vampir (a thoughtful vampire) in Evgenii Onegin, Mikhail Lermontov's and Mikhail VrubelЈ's Demon, Nikolai GogolЈ's horrifying visions, and Aleksandr Blok's vampirstvennyi vek (vampiric century). 57 Vampire stories were popular in the gulag. In Shalamov's story "ZaklinatelЈ zmei" (Snake charmer, 1954), prisoners force a fellow prisoner, Platonov, to entertain them with "stories." Platonov's favorite was "Count Dracula," but prisoners preferred Russian pulp fi ction. 58 This is how Shalamov saw the Soviet writer: as a snake charmer, a magician who mesmerizes the public because, if he fails to do so, the public will beat him to death.
In the twenty-fi rst century, the new generation of post-Soviet writers have produced a variety of strange animals, monsters, and modifi ed humans. Though the fantasy of fashionable post-Soviet authors such as Pelevin, Vladimir Sorokin, Vladimir Sharov, and Bykov seems unlimited, their actual themes overlap. They seem to be mostly interested in two areas of human experience-religion and history-which they combine in rich and shocking ways. At the same time, they are not concerned about 59 These stories have little in common with "science fi ction" even in the broadest understanding of this term; with the exception of history, which they scrutinize in their unique ways, these narratives are not concerned with knowledge and technology. 60 They do not belong to "popular literature," as experts defi ne it. Yet these writers are successful among Russian readers. They publish their novels with mainstream commercial publishers, produce literary scandals, and receive national prizes. To be sure, their commercial success depends upon the content of their novels, which responds to the unarticulated expectations of the audience and shapes these expectations. In recent years, "vampiric" and "demonic" themes have also proliferated in popular culture. 61 A theoretical approach to these narratives can be found in a seemingly distant paradigm Benjamin created in his writings on mourning plays, baroque dramas of sorrow and mystery. Like Freud's study of the work of mourning (Trauerarbeit), Benjamin's study of the play of mourning (Trauerspiel) combines factual observations and the personal project of mourn-jamin predicted. 70 Today, his work on the Trauerspiel helps us read the new Russian cultural scene through a triple allegory that integrates different melancholic epochs-the baroque, Weimar, and the post-Soviet.
In Tridtsataia liubovЈ Mariny (Marina's thirtieth love, 1999), Sorokin draws an ironic picture of a young Muscovite who vacillates in her commitment to political dissidents and Soviet true-believers. Marina's loves, male and female, defy novelistic convention by their very multitude. Like other post-Soviet novels, this is a story of a community rather than an individual. In her dissident stage, Marina imagines underground Moscow in a typically post-Soviet manner: "Under Stalin's skyscrapers, under the puppet-like Kremlin, under modern constructions lie the pressed bones of millions of the tortured, murdered by the scary machinery of the gulag. . . . Nothing has changed here. It seemed that time ossifi ed or maybe was canceled by decree. The hands of the Kremlin chimes turn in vain, like a windup doll without a spring." 71 Paradoxically, since there are so few monuments on the former sites of the gulag, these sites are imagined to be everywhere. In her search for truth and love, Marina spins around in vain, like a windup doll, and reshapes herself into a Soviet specter when her thirtieth love, a communist leader, manages to bring her to her fi rst orgasm but traps her mind in Soviet discourse. This erotic novel effectively predicted the political events of the subsequent decade. History folds here into a cursed, spectral loop, like in the mourning play that features a particular conception of time which is repetitive rather than "fulfi lled" and "spectral, not mythic." 72 In Sorokin's Led (Ice, 2002), the characters are born-again rather than undead. People of the Ice produce their fellowship by hammering humans with sacred Ice. A few are fully transformed, but many more are killed in the process. The People of the Ice make their way into the core of the KGB and exploit the system for their benefi t. In its own way, Sorokin's fantasy responds to the same desperate quest for meaning that inspired Bykov's Justifi cation. The People of the Ice do not look like animals, do not suck blood (in fact, they are vegetarians), and are mortal. Like vampires, however, they are parasites on humans, whom they use with the utmost cruelty. These mystics produce their alternative history in intonations that are reminiscent of some Russian religious narratives, starting from Avvakum. Performing sacral manipulations on human bodies, the People of the Ice strive to reach a magic number of their fellowship, which will bring about the desired end of the world. This construction (managing an apocalypse by mutilating a target number of men and women) is probably taken from the central myth of the Skoptsy sect. 73 Like many of their his-torical predecessors, Sorokin's characters struggle to overcome history but inevitably return to it. Quite recently, several Slavic scholars argued that the concept of magical realism can be applied to east European literatures that have been recently emancipated from Soviet domination and are arguably postcolonial; examples were the late Soviet works of non-Russian writers, the Kirgiz Chingiz Aitmatov and the Abkhazian Fasil Iskander, for example, as well as post-Soviet Ukrainian literature. 74 Coined in Weimar Germany and then applied to Latin American and African fi ction, the concept of magical realism made a huge loop before it arrived in the post-Soviet space. 75 Salman Rushdie famously described magical realism as "the commingling of the improbable and the mundane." 76 Improbable as they are, Sorokin's, Sharov's, or Bykov's novels do not have much of what could be plausibly characterized as mundane. Although they entail plenty of magic, to deem them "realistic" would be plainly wrong.
I believe that the application of the concept of magical realism to post-Soviet Russian fi ction requires a major theoretical revision. Contemporary Russian narratives are similar to and different from magical realist ones in several important respects. They are similar because they make extensive use of magic in a full-scale novelistic construction. They also present an implicit critique of contemporary society by revising its historical foundations. They are different because they are self-consciously distanced from the traditions of the realist novel that are critical to magical realism. The post-Soviet novel does not emulate social reality and does not compete with the psychological novel; what it emulates and struggles with, is history. I believe that a reasonable description for this particular trend in post-Soviet literature is magical historicism.
Michael Wood distinguishes between two kinds of magical realism, one that is magic in its material and realist in its style (when "fantasy was represented by the deadest of deadpans, as if the author were reciting a telephone book"), and another that is realist in material and magical in style (when "the facts are the facts, but they are given to us as if they are fables"). Wood seems to be mostly interested in the fi rst kind of narratives, which he suggests are written as if the reporter is sober and re-losopher Nikolai Fedorov and a covey of old Bolsheviks. While the narrator is recording the oral history of these survivors, an apocalyptic fl ood drowns Moscow. A trained Soviet historian who refashioned himself into a post-Soviet writer, Sharov describes his credo: "The history I learned was not the history of humans. It was the history of hectares, crops, fi nancial fl ows . . . It was entirely foreign to me . . . I am trying to understand what the revolution was, . . . why the people who had beautiful dreams committed monstrous crimes." 80 For some readers, Sharov's, Sorokin's, or Pelevin's novels give clearer answers to these questions than social history does. Michael Wood's twin concepts of drunk reality and sober observer help us understand Sharov's fantasy of the eternal, Russifi ed Madame de Staël. 81 Indeed, who could have been an impartial observer of the revolution and terror? If such an observer could be imagined, he or she would be a fantastic personality. In Before and Then, the author bothers himself with such questions and presents a complex narrative construction that consists of the anchor character, de Staël, and the fi rst-person narrator who collects her oral history. In other types of narratives, the author simply emulates the person-less voice of a history textbook.
In melancholic visions of Sharov, Sorokin, and their colleagues, the past is perceived not just as "another country" but as an exotic and unexplored one, still pregnant with unborn alternatives and imminent miracles. Arguably, the expanded use of the subjunctive tense characterizes postrevolutionary periods. The feeling of loss opens up questions of what might have been. 82 Possessed by the ghostly past and unable to withdraw from its repetitive contemplation, post-Soviet writers fi nd themselves trapped in a state of melancholia. At the same time, their readers celebrate an unprecedented consumer boom but feel the loss of the political opportunities they recently enjoyed. Writing in a glossy men's journal, the cultural critic Grigorii Revzin described the situation in political rather than clinical terms: "The past does not know the subjunctive mood only if the present does know it. . . . If the present is what you cannot change at all, the past becomes what you can change in every possible way." 83 When politics does not provide alternatives, historiography offers them in abundance.
In the fi nal account, the popularity of magical historicism among post-Soviet writers and readers realizes the "compromise by which the command of reality is carried out piecemeal" that Freud ascribed to mel-
